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Introduction 
I first began to study Marx some twenty-three years ago. In those days 
there were many things that made it easy to become interested in 
Marx: among them the political ferment of the late 1960s and the fact 
that at the University of California at San Diego, where I was a grad-
uate student, there were several important and interesting Marxists-
Fredric Jameson, Herbert Marcuse, and Stanley Moore. The latter two 
were my teachers in the Philosophy Department, and the latter, to 
whom this book is dedicated, became my dissertation director. More-
over, the spirit of Marx was in the air and it seemed necessary to read 
him to understand what was happening in the world. 
Despite the political ferment of the late I 960s, there were things that 
made it difficult for me to accept Marx at first. As an undergraduate, I 
had studied in a great books program at St. Mary's College of Califor-
nia, and the Philosophy Department at UC San Diego, very much un-
der the influence of Richard Popkin at that time, took a history of ideas 
approach to philosophy. There were things about Marx that seemed at 
odds with my whole educational background. Some of his texts, es-
pecially the Communist Manifesto , made him seem like a sort of com-
munist Descartes, like someone who would sweep aside all past cul-
ture, tradition, and morality-as if there were nothing of value to be 
found there-and start over with a clean slate. 1 
I have come to see that this was not an accurate picture of Marx, 
and indeed, a great deal of my work over the last twenty-three years 
has involved exploring the roots of Marx's thought in earlier tradition 
and rejecting anything like a Cartesian break. This is still a part of 
what motivates this present book. I would like to show that Marx 
grows out of and tries to go beyond, that he tries to solve the problems 
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and realize the potential of, the tradition in political theory of Hobbes, 
Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. 
Since my years as a graduate student, however, a different perspec-
tive on Marx has increasingly developed. Indeed, in many ways, it is 
a product of the radicalism of the l 960s. I would not say that this new 
perspective has replaced other perspectives. It exists alongside and 
competes with them, but it is gaining in power. For this perspective, 
far from it being the case that Marx is a communist Descartes who 
sweeps aside all past tradition, Marx is the very opposite. He is all too 
deeply rooted in past tradition-in ethnocentrism, in sexism, and in a 
totalizing antipluralism. Far from it being the case that Marx rejects 
and thereby liberates himself from past tradition, he has not at all freed 
himself from many of the most oppressive and dominating aspects of 
our past. Thus, in Chapters 7 and 8, I want to respond to some of the 
objections that contemporary theorists have raised against Marx, and I 
want to argue that just as I once was mistaken in thinking that Marx 
had rejected too much of the past, so these contemporary theorists are 
mistaken in thinking that Marx has not rejected very much of it. Marx 
does begin to free himself from these past forms of domination, sig-
nificantly so for a nineteenth-century theorist, and he does so more 
than is obvious on the surface of his writings, which, after all, were 
not aimed at a twentieth-century audience, or focused in twentieth-
century terms and categories, or for twentieth-century sensitivities. 
When Marx is understood, I think he can contribute to contemporary 
theory that wants to free itself from traditional sexism and ethnocen-
trism and create a pluralist society. 
This book makes no pretense of being a complete history of modern 
political philosophy. It deals with only a few figures: Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. It leaves out many others. And it 
makes no attempt to say anywhere near everything that might be said 
about any of these figures. It is merely a series of limited studies that 
I hope will bring into focus an interesting and important set of issues 
and problems. 
Given my concern in the later chapters with certain contemporary 
forms of oppression, domination, and power, one of the issues that I 
want to discuss in the early chapters is the traditional concept of sov-
ereignty as it develops from Hobbes to Marx. For Hobbes, the govern-
ment must be sovereign and sovereign power must be absolute. This 
was so because Hobbes, I will try to argue in Chapter 1, had no social 
theory, only a political theory. The only power capable of holding cit-
izens together in a civil body, for Hobbes, was a political power-the 
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government or the sovereign. If the government lost its grip, individ-
uals collapsed back into the state of nature. 
Locke, by contrast, developed a social theory and thus was able to 
argue for limited government and the sovereignty of the people. The 
better your social theory-that is, the more cohesion you are able to 
find among the citizens apart from the political sphere-the less power 
the government need have to hold the citizens together. If you have a 
good enough social theory, then, with Marx, you might even begin to 
talk about the withering away of the state and, I will try to argue, the 
dissolution of sovereignty. For Hobbes, since he had no notion of so-
cial cohesion, the sovereign had to be absolute. For Locke, there is 
enough social cohesion to argue that government can be limited and 
that the people can be sovereign. This social cohesion, for Locke, 
arises out of property, property interest, commerce, and trade. Unfor-
tunately, I will argue in Chapter 2, Locke does not succeed in making 
the people sovereign. His emphasis on unequal property shifts sover-
eignty to the propertied classes and in effect makes them sovereign 
over the propertyless. 
For this reason, Rousseau rejects commerce, trade, and seriously 
unequal property as incompatible with the common good or the gen-
eral will. Instead, he focuses on custom, tradition, and community as 
the forces capable of providing enough social cohesion so that the peo-
ple can be sovereign and so that they can establish a general will and 
thus rational freedom. Rousseau is not a totalitarian as so many think. 
Rather, I argue in Chapter 3, he achieves an ideal but utopian synthesis 
of individual liberty and community. His views are utopian because 
healthy customs, traditions, and community simply have to be given 
in a premodern society, and they are incompatible with wealth, com-
merce, and trade. Such a society is impossible to realize in the real 
modern world. 
Kant's philosophy of history, I argue in Chapter 4, is capable of 
explaining how particular, conflicting interests embedded in com-
merce and trade can lead toward the universal, the common good, or 
the categorical imperative rather than erode it as Rousseau thought 
they would. And thus Kant can go beyond Rousseau-he not only has 
a theory of the ideal society but a theory for how actually to realize it 
in the modern world. But, on the other hand, Kant has nothing to say 
about, and no way to realize, community. 
Hegel attempts to synthesize much of this earlier tradition. He very 
clearly rejects a Hobbesian absolute sovereign that stands over society 
and holds the citizens together from outside. Hegel does have a social 
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theory that explains the internal coherence of society apart from the 
governmental or political sphere. He sees that property, property inter-
est, and trade in civil society provide this coherence much as for 
Locke, and he also sees that custom, tradition, and community provide 
this coherence much as for Rousseau. At the same time, he seems 
aware that unrestrained commerce and trade would shift power to the 
wealthy classes. On the other hand, Hegel does not want to eliminate 
wealth, commerce, and trade as for Rousseau and thus make the ideal 
state impossible to realize in the modern world. He sees, with Kant, 
that particular interests can lead to the universal. 
Hegel ' s conception of the modern state is thus very similar to Rous-
seau ' s ideal community based upon rational freedom realized through 
a general will and reinforced by custom, tradition, and community. 
And Hegel develops a philosophy of history similar to Kant's that will 
allow him to explain the development of an ideal moral society in the 
modern world based upon a general will that at the same time is com-
patible with wealth, commerce, and trade. But, as we will see in Chap-
ter 5, to achieve this synthesis among particular interests, the general 
will, and community, Hegel must abandon individual consciousness 
and move to spirit. 
The laws and institutions of the state, for Hegel, arise through the 
historical development of the spirit of a people. Through alienation the 
citizens create the state as their own objectification and then are dis-
ciplined by their state. Through this process, both the state and indi-
viduals are molded so that individuals receive rational laws that accord 
with the universal and also with their own interests, but, for Hegel, the 
citizens do not democratically control their institutions or give them-
selves their own laws as for Rousseau. Their laws and institutions just 
arise through the historical development of spirit. 
In order to explain how history can move toward the ideal society, 
Marx develops a theory of revolution. In many respects this theory is 
based upon Kant's philosophy of history. Conflicting interests, or in 
Marx's case, conflicting class interests, lead toward the common good. 
In fact, the class interest of the proletariat, we shall see, will lead it to 
act in accordance with the categorical imperative-it will drive the 
proletariat toward the development of an ideal moral society. Locke 
was the first to develop a theory of legitimate revolution; except, I will 
argue, revolution was legitimate for Locke only to defend property, 
not at all to allow the propertyless to transform things so as to achieve 
a more equitable society. Kant relies on conflict among nations to 
achieve the ideal society, and he is even willing to accept the gains in 
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this direction made by revolutions, but he is unwilling or unable to 
allow that any revolution can be legitimate. 
At any rate, Marx develops a philosophy of history in many ways 
like that of Kant, which will allow him to realize an ideal society that, 
much like Rousseau's, is a radically democratic and egalitarian com-
munity. In these respects, Marx's project is very similar to the project 
of Hegel, but Marx wants to accomplish all of this while avoiding 
Hegel's rejection of concrete Rousseauian democracy. Moreover, 
Marx wants to avoid Hegel's abandonment of individual conscious-
ness and his move to spirit. To accomplish this Marx tries to realize a 
communal individual and to dissolve sovereignty. 
This very brief sketch, which touches upon only a few of the issues 
that we will take up, nevertheless, I hope, at least suggests how I think 
Marx's thought grows out of, synthesizes, and realizes the tradition 
that precedes him. Marx not only develops a theory capable of com-
bining community with rational freedom and concrete democracy, he 
also moves beyond utopianism. He develops a theory of how actually 
to bring the ideal society about in the modern world. This is to say, 
certainly, that he brings to fruition the tradition of Rousseau, Kant, and 
Hegel. It might be thought that this leaves out, and perhaps is even 
incompatible with, the tradition that begins in Locke and develops in 
modern liberalism. In fact, Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx have all been 
accused of being totalitarians or at least of being on the road toward 
totalitarianism. I do not think this charge can be sustained. But even if 
I am right it would still seem clear to most people that a Marxian 
society would fall far short of what would be considered an ideally 
open, tolerant, and pluralistic society. Thus, in Chapter 7, I would like 
to argue something that should be a bit surprising, namely, that the 
society Marx envisions is very definitely a pluralist society and that 
pluralism is compatible with community. In Chapter 8, I will also try 
to argue that Marx envisions this ideal pluralistic community as one 
that will bring about the emancipation of women, and that Marx, if 
correctly understood, could contribute more to modern feminist theory 
than many modern feminists have thought he can. 
I have claimed that Marx moves beyond utopianism. We must no-
tice, however, that there are two ways in which one can use the term 
"utopian." In one of these senses Marx is not a utopian; in the other 
he very definitely is. In the first sense, political theorists are utopian if 
they simply describe an ideal society without having any theory of 
how actually to realize it in the real world. In other words, the theorist 
has no philosophy of history or theory of social transformation, or at 
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least not one that can explain how to bring the ideal society about. 
Plato, Thomas More, and, I will argue, Rousseau are good examples 
of such utopian theorists. Marx, on the other hand, has a very highly 
developed philosophy of history, an elaborate theory of social trans-
formation, and a complex theory of revolution by which he tries to 
explain how to realize the ideal society. For Kant and for Marx it is 
not enough to merely describe the ideal society; a serious political 
theorist must explain how to realize it. In this sense Marx is definitely 
not utopian. 
Nevertheless, there will always be some tension here. After all , in 
order to make it easier to develop a theory of how to realize the ideal 
society, a theorist can always make the ideal a bit easier to realize-
the theorist can water down the ideal. The less ideal your ideal society, 
the less it goes beyond actually existing society, the easier it is likely 
to be to realize and the less utopian it will be-and, very likely, the 
less interesting it will be also. On the other hand, the more you em-
phasize the ideal character of the ideal society, the further it goes be-
yond actually existing society, the greater and more radical the social 
transformation it involves, all of this will make it increasingly difficult 
for the theory of how to realize the ideal to keep up with the ideal. 
Such a theorist is not utopian in the first sense. Such a theorist has a 
theory of how to realize the ideal. It is just that this theorist's concep-
tion of the ideal society is always running a bit ahead of the theory of 
how to realize the ideal society. Marx is such a theorist and he is uto-
pian in this second sense. 
In my opinion this second type of utopianism is acceptable-even 
desirable. We do not want to water down the ideal to make it easier to 
achieve. We always want to keep the ideal a bit ahead of what we are 
likely to be able to realize. If we stripped Marx of his idealism in this 
area, if we were to accept only what was practically realizable and 
soberly possible in Marx's thought, we would eliminate a great deal 
of his power, his brilliance, and his value--or at least I think so. As 
this book proceeds, the reader will notice that I tend to move through 
the sober, practical, realizable aspects of Marx's thought as quickly as 
is reasonably possible and that I tend to focus on his ideal side--on 
those aspects of Marx's thought that certainly have not been realized 
and that to some will appear impossible ever to realize. Perhaps this is 
a failure of mine. Perhaps this is a failure of Marx's. But then perhaps 
this is what will live when all else is dead in Marx's thought. 
Even if Marxism as a political movement is already dead, even if 
Marx's theory of how to realize the ideal has totally failed, as our 
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liberal journalists now take such great joy in telling us over and over 
again at every opportunity, perhaps it is only this ideal element in 
Marx that can remain to inspire us. Marx ' s thought, as we shall see, 
always contains a hope-the glimmer, the lure, of a beautiful world, 
the highest good, the realization of the species' essence. 
Despite the fact that most of our liberal journalists seem to believe 
that Marxism has collapsed in Eastern Europe, it must be said that few 
Western Marxists-and for a great many years before this collapse-
would have accepted the notion that Eastern European societies were 
Marxist in the first place. This may sound like a cheap way to avoid 
the issue, but that is very largely due to the news media's ability to 
make us see reality as they see it. They have us convinced that Eastern 
European societies were Marxist and that Marxism has now collapsed. 
But if Western Marxists have been denying for many years that these 
societies were Marxist, I do not see why we should change our minds 
now. Moreover, even the most superficial reading of Marx should 
show that in very fundamental ways Eastern European societies were 
not Marxist. Marx rejected the existence of a state standing over and 
dominating society, whereas the Soviet Union had one of the most 
powerful, dominating, bureaucratic state apparatuses in the world. 
Marx rejected a standing army attached to the state and held that the 
only kind of army compatible with democracy was a citizen militia, 
an army controlled by the citizens that they could use to ensure that 
the state did not try to stand over and dominate society, whereas the 
Soviet Union had one of the most powerful standing armies in the 
world attached to and controlled by the state. And Marx was a radical 
democrat; he even rejected representatives, who go off and vote as 
they see fit, in favor of deputies, who are given very strict voting in-
structions and are immediately recallable by their constituents. The 
Soviet Union certainly did not have deputies-it did not even really 
have representatives. 
So, whatever has collapsed in Eastern Europe, it was not Marx-
ism--certainly not as Marx understood it, nor as Western Marxists 
have understood it for quite some time now. The Soviet Union and 
other Eastern European societies right now are in serious need of some 
very practical, concrete, technical assistance. They certainly will not 
get much help in this area from a writer who has been dead for over a 
century. What they might get from Marx is something different-a 
hope, a better vision, the lure of an ideal. 
Despite our liberal journalists, the abandonment of communism and 
the embracing of markets in Eastern Europe is not going all that well. 
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A popular joke in Hungary had it that the Communist government 
needed forty years to lose the moral support of the people. For its 
successor, one year was enough.2 However, I certainly do not wish to 
try to predict what will occur in Eastern Europe. But one thing-ad-
mittedly of a wildly speculative sort-that might be said about Russia 
is that while it has definitely made very healthy moves toward democ-
racy that everyone hopes will be preserved, at the same time, there are 
many in Russian society that do not at all want to give up socialism. 
Is it too utopian to hope that Russia, which has had nothing to do with 
the collapse of Marxism, might eventually move closer to the realiza-
tion of truer Marxian ideals? If there is any chance at all of this, per-
haps it justifies continued work to uncover this ideal dimension in 
Marx's thought. At any rate, I in no way apologize for such utopian-
ism. 
The charge of utopianism can be very intimidating. One of the most 
powerful arguments that can be made against moral and political ide-
als is to call them unrealistic, impossible, utopian. This is usually 
thought to be a trump. Case closed. Nothing more to say. Moreover, 
political theorists worry about such charges and try to avoid them. It 
seems to me that there is a great deal of unthinking that goes on here. 
If a theorist makes a sound argument that certain of our social or 
political institutions are oppressive, unjust, or immoral, what does it 
amount to to argue that it would be unrealistic and utopian to eliminate 
those institutions-that you cannot imagine being able to significantly 
change those institutions? This may merely indicate a failure of your 
imagination. Who could have imagined the collapse of old-style So-
viet Marxism twenty years ago? Who could have imagined in 1950 
the advances that blacks and women have made in the United States 
since then, inadequate as these advances have been? What does it 
mean to call a moral ideal utopian, impossible, unrealistic? Is this in-
tended to eliminate all moral obligation on our part with respect to this 
ideal? That is often what is suggested by such accusations. But I do 
not think so. "Ought implies can" has been a truism since Kant enun-
ciated the proposition. But it seems to me we cannot accept this prop-
osition when it comes to political ideals. It may be that we cannot 
imagine how we can eliminate these immoral, unjust, and oppressive 
institutions. It may seem impossible to do so. Nevertheless, we still 
have a moral obligation to remove them. If we cannot imagine how, 
then we will just have to rely on the imagination of others until we 
can begin to imagine how ourselves. And we must always remember 
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that what it seems possible to accomplish will change with every step 
we take. 
In three earlier books on Marx I have approached his thought his-
torically in the sense that I have argued that there are different periods 
of his thought and that he fundamentally changes certain of his views 
in these different periods.3 I have not changed my mind about these 
matters and one will still find references of this sort in the present 
book, but the last three chapters, which deal with Marx, are not, as my 
earlier books were, structured to reflect the different periods of Marx ' s 
thought. That would simply make matters far more complicated than 
they already are and it is my purpose to focus on other sorts of histor-
ical connections in this book. 
One of these, which will become quite central for us in Chapters 6 
and 7, has already started to emerge here, namely the tension that ex-
ists in the modern world between freedom and community. The diffi-
culty of conceiving, let alone realizing, a society that is both commu-
nal and that preserves individual freedom is, I think, one of the major 
problems, if not the major problem, of modern political theory. 
As I will argue, especially in Chapter 6, human beings need com-
munity; they need it to have a sense of belonging and to be at home 
in their world. Moreover, community creates a sense of familiarity that 
makes it possible to work with others smoothly and comfortably, to be 
close enough to them so that individuals can learn from each other, so 
that they can develop their powers and capacities, indeed, so that they 
develop as human beings. Furthermore, community facilitates com-
munication that is necessary for all of these things and that is also, 
most importantly, necessary to allow us to uncover and overcome any 
oppressions that hitherto have not been recognized in the community. 
Community can also combat anomie, aloneness, and alienation. It can 
give one a sense of place, a sense that what you are and are doing is 
proper, recognized, meaningful, and significant. It can give one a sense 
of reality and rightness among the other members of one's community 
and in one's world. In the past it has even given individuals a sense of 
being ontologically plugged into the cosmos, rooted in the real and the 
right. The absence of community in the modern world leaves a cold 
and lonely abyss. 
The trouble, however, before we get carried away with community, 
is that traditional communities always involved serious oppression-
the domination and oppression of women, of other races or religions, 
of the lower classes, of science by religion, and of progress by custom 
and tradition, to name only a few. The modern world, on the other 
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hand, has come almost to define itself, at least in very large part, by 
its concern with freedom, and freedom understood, in very large part, 
as freedom-from , certainly as freedom-from all these traditional 
oppressions but very possibly as freedom-from the premodern tradi-
tional community itself. 
As this modern conception of freedom arose and established itself 
in Europe, it meant rejecting the authority of the Church-its authority 
over science, philosophy, politics, and morality. The rise of modern 
science, for example, meant that each discipline carved out its own 
autonomous area, subject to no authority but reason, and certainly not 
subject to religious authority. 4 Protestantism even carried this principle 
into the realm of religion itself. Religious belief should be free from 
any external authority, certainly of the Roman church, and based 
solely on individual conscience. With the rise of capitalism, the mod-
ern world shed the authority of the community over the economic 
sphere in favor of individual liberty, competition, and particular inter-
ests. 
One can almost say that what modernity means, or at least a signif-
icant part of what it means, is a continuous, ongoing process of liber-
ation, of emancipating one group after another, of freeing them from 
one oppression after another. Abolitionists work to eliminate slavery. 
Socialists try to free the working class from capitalist oppression. 
Feminists work to free women from traditional male domination. The 
modern world, we can even say, is out to discover ever-new oppres-
sions embedded in the traditional past and to free individuals from 
them. 
Furthermore, what this ongoing process of liberation also seems to 
imply is that each attempt at emancipation from traditional authority 
is likely, sooner or later, to be attacked, in its turn, as an inadequate 
attempt at emancipation. It will be attacked for failing to get to the 
root of the oppression and it may even be attacked by more progres-
sive emancipatory movements as itself a new form of oppression. 
Protestant fundamentalism comes to be seen, by modern liberalism, no 
longer as a radical form of emancipation but as a closed-minded form 
of intolerance. The role of capitalism in emancipating us from feudal-
ism is far outweighed, for socialists, by its oppression of the proletar-
iat. And then socialists in their turn come to be seen as totalitarian 
oppressors. Even modern science, which prides itself on being free of, 
and freeing us from, all ideology, is now being criticized by modern 
feminists for its ideological blindness with respect to women. 
The real strength of modernity is that it digs deeper and deeper, that 
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it continuously uncovers new forms and layers of oppression, brings 
them to light, attacks them, and tries to overcome them. And then even 
this emancipatory process itself is seen as still containing some op-
pression and is attacked in its turn. This is a powerful dynamic of 
liberation. At the same time, though, it continuously makes it impos-
sible to establish any tradition, any community, any place, any at-
homeness. We never seem to be able to purge our traditions of all 
oppression so as to finally fit ourselves into them and be at home. We 
always find further oppressions dirtying our nest. 
This drive for freedom, for freedom-from, liberates us from oppres-
sion. And without any doubt such liberation is an absolute necessity 
for achieving the good life. But this liberation does not itself give us 
the good life. It is a necessary means to the good life. The good life is 
not possible while any oppression remains. But liberation from op-
pression is not itself the good life. It is empty. It continuously negates, 
rejects, eliminates, eradicates, destroys. It not only negates and elimi-
nates external authorities and institutions out in the social world, but 
it criticizes, attacks, negates, and eliminates within ourselves-atti-
tudes, assumptions, values, feelings, and so forth. It empties us of un-
desirable qualities, but it does not fill us with anything. 
Moreover, this modern form of emancipation, this freedom-from, 
must at least shy away from itself endorsing anything positive, any 
substantive form of the good life, any tradition, any form of commu-
nity, because to do so can and, sooner or later, probably will become 
something for others to attack, to free themselves from, a new form of 
oppression. The modern tendency seems to be ever toward pluralism, 
diversity, difference. Endorsing a single conception of the good is seen 
as totalizing, as imposing one's views on others, even as totalitarian-
ism. Or at least one more and more frequently hears such arguments 
these days. 
At any rate, community has little chance of establishing itself in the 
face of this continued and ongoing liberation. And liberation cannot 
achieve community. The future of any liberation is to be perceived as 
an oppression that calls for further liberation. Or at least this has been 
true of liberations in the past. Everyone hopes that it will not be true 
of their own liberation movement. 
I am not poking fun here. I am certainly not dismissing liberation. 
Liberation, the liberation of workers, of women, of racial and ethnic 
minorities, and of others, is absolutely essential. Community without 
such liberation is not acceptable and not possible. Yet continuous lib-
eration that never achieves community, that never roots itself in tradi-
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tion, that never achieves anything positive and substantive, is ulti-
mately not acceptable either. 
Marx, I think, was aware of this problem, at least at the level it had 
reached in his era, and he was trying to resolve it. He fully endorses, 
to the level he understands them, to the level that they had materially 
and ideologically emerged, the liberation movements of his time. He 
endorses the modern liberation from religious authority.5 He himself 
attacked the authority of science, at least the ideological authority of 
the science of political economy.6 He wrote many articles in support 
of the emancipation of slaves in the United States. 7 He endorsed the 
emancipation of women, as I will argue in Chapter 8. And, of course, 
he spent his life working for the emancipation of the working class. 
At the same time, he wanted to regain community and, indeed, saw it 
as a necessary element of this liberation. 
How then is it possible to reconcile, make compatible, community 
and liberation? It will take a good deal of space to explain this in 
Chapter 7. Here we can at least say that, in the first place, we must 
come to understand the ideal community and the good life , not as a 
static blueprint, a neat and final set of institutions, a finished utopia, 
but rather as a society that engages in a certain form of activity- free 
activity, activity that develops powers and capacities, that enriches the 
individual , activity that is an end in itself. Such activity would leave 
plenty of room for emancipation, even for ongoing emancipation, for 
resisting any authority that would try to dominate this activity, make 
it serve an end other than its own. At the same time this activity would 
involve interaction with others in a community, an interaction that 
would create bonds, meaning, connection, at-homeness. This commu-
nity, then, cannot be static; it has no room for traditional authority, 
authority that stands over and dominates. Marx rejects a state standing 
over society, capitalists standing over workers, men over women, 
whites over blacks. Individuals must empower themselves by interact-
ing with each other in an egalitarian and pluralist community. We will 
have a great deal more to say about this in Chapter 7. 
Yet the Marxian attempt to synthesize liberation and community has 
not succeeded-it has certainly not been accepted. At least a part of 
the reason for this is that any liberation movement resents other move-
ments that claim to go beyond it. Capitalism, which begins as a liber-
ation movement and certainly still sees itself as a liberation move-
ment-and Marx would at least agree that it once was8-resents the 
Marxist's claim that capitalism does not go far enough, that it op-
presses workers. Either it doesn ' t like hearing this truth or is unable to 
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accept it as a truth. It feels threatened and counterattacks, at times 
violently and always ideologically. It accuses Marxism of being even 
more oppressive. Moreover, other newer liberation movements that 
have not yet succeeded in their liberation often tend to see Marxism 
as part of the establishment, as another form of oppression, as a hin-
drance to their program of liberation. 
And without a doubt, a large part of the Marxist movement is guilty 
as charged. A very large part of the Marxist movement has failed to 
see the dialectic that Marx envisions between ongoing liberation and 
community. A large part of the Marxist movement is unable to move 
beyond its own original notions of liberation, let alone reconcile them 
with community. 
Marxism has real weaknesses. It has weaknesses at the level of 
practice-the horrors we have seen in communist societies. It also has 
theoretical weaknesses. It does not have a complete theory for the 
emancipation of women, less even for races, and, given the develop-
ment of modern capitalism since Marx, not even for workers. Yet, I 
want to argue that what we very importantly find in Marx is a recog-
nition of the two sides of this most important and crucial modern ten-
sion. We find a recognition of the need for liberation, freedom from 
domination of all sorts, a continuous, ongoing, emancipation, and, at 
the same time, the recognition that this is not enough, the recognition 
that we need community. And Marx has a theory for how to connect 
these two. 
It seems to me that the modern world, if it cannot accept Marxism 
as it was written by Marx, or certainly as it was played out by the 
Marxist tradition, which for the most part fell far below the level of 
Marx, this modern world then needs a new Marxism if it is to solve 
the problem of reconciling freedom and community. Any solution, I 
suspect, will have to pay careful attention to Marx and perhaps even 
launch itself from Marx. This book, it is hoped, will be a modest at-
tempt to bring this problem into focus. 
I am sure, though, that some will see the hope of finding anything 
in Marx that can be valuable for our world as a lost cause and as the 
greatest naivete. For them, Marx is an old dog that should finally be 
buried and forgotten. Others might admit that a standard historical 
treatment of Marx, the old dog, is an acceptable scholarly project, but 
that linking him with current, "stylish" matters like feminism, ethno-
centrism, and pluralism is likely to weaken what might otherwise be a 
solid study. This problem, however, is not just a problem with the 
present book. It is a problem in our world. To take just one example, 
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we see the very same tension in the current debate over humanities 
core courses in the United States. 
Many contemporary theorists want to dismiss traditional authors, 
the canon, great books-which after all were written by white, Euro-
pean, upper-class males. These books should be read critically-very 
critically. They should be called before the bar of modern antisexist , 
antiracist, antiethnocentric criticism and thoroughly denounced. This 
is all right. I have no objection to it. But there also are problems here. 
Keeping in mind what has already been said about the modern drive 
toward liberation, one of the things that any decent education should 
do, it seems to me, is to call into question, force us to reflect upon , 
our own modern norms, values, outlooks, assumptions, and perspec-
tives. In other words, one of the things that any decent education 
should do is what those old racist, sexist, and ethnocentric dogs back 
in the nineteenth century were so good at doing-using history to un-
dermine. They used history to show us that our present views, assump-
tions, and values are not fixed, eternal, and natural, that they had not 
always been held, that they developed in a specific period under spe-
cific conditions, that they thus could very obviously change in the fu-
ture, and thus that something better was possible. Darwin used history 
to undermine the fixity of species. Marx used it to undermine the fixity 
and naturalness of capitalism. Nietzsche used it to undermine the fixity 
and normativeness of Judeo-Christian morality. With a bit of work, 
one could even argue that Freud used the history of the individual to 
undermine consciousness. 
To simply sift through the great books of the past, denouncing them 
for being racist, sexist, ethnocentric, and so forth, is all right. It will 
not sustain your interest for long. To see nothing else in them is a 
serious mistake. To try to see how a modern antiracist, antiethnocen-
tric, and feminist consciousness arose out of them is more interesting. 
But to do any of this without calling our own norms, values, and as-
sumptions-yes, even our own antiracist, feminist, antiethnocentric 
values, norms, and assumptions-into question is to perpetuate what 
we are trying to overcome. 
We should, as Marx and other nineteenth-century thinkers did so 
well, use history to undermine the status quo. We must see that our 
values , the ones we accept, our own feminist, antiracist, antiethnocen-
tric values, are not just our values, above and beyond all that has pre-
ceded us, neat and clean and isolated. Our values are the outcome of 
earlier history. They are certainly a reaction against, but they also grew 
out of, and thus in an important sense are dependent upon, our earlier 
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history, which we are so critically sorting through and denouncing. 
And this certainly would seem to suggest that having grown out of 
this dirty past there might well be some serious flaws in our own 
views, unless we think we have reached the Absolute. 
We must come to see that our own values, even our best ones, are 
part of a process, a process that goes beyond but that also grows out 
of and deeply depends on what precedes us historically. If we fail to 
see this, the next liberation movement to come along will ruthlessly 
remind us of it. We must see not only what is no longer acceptable 
about the past, but how the past made us possible, how we depend 
upon it, how we are tied to it, how we are stuck with it. We are our 
past to a very great extent. We must see how the past leads to the best 
norms, values, and assumptions we have and at the same time how our 
best values, norms, and assumptions, the ones we believe in most 
deeply, are probably also polluted by our past and therefore need to be 
improved upon. The past that we continuously reject and undermine 
also continuously undermines us. 
To simply reject the past, to lump it all together as sexist, racist, and 
ethnocentric, and put it behind us can cause us to forget to question 
the very values that allow us to dismiss the past in this way. It can 
cause us to fail to see our own process of development and to rest 
content with what we are, accept our own values as final: exactly what 
every liberation movement in the past has mistakenly done, namely, 
denounce everything but itself. 
To bring alive the past, to see our dependence on it, our complicity 
with it, to see that we have not gotten completely above it or outside 
it, will cause us to question, reflect upon, our own values-not those 
of others of our contemporaries, but our very own values-and to 
push them further. And, of course, as soon as we develop new values 
and perspectives and use them to study the past, we will see a new 
and different past, out of which we now will see ourselves growing in 
a different way, understand ourselves differently, and so forth. 
The past conditions our present norms at least in the sense that we 
position ourselves to reject precisely what has occurred in our past 
with the consciousness, perspectives, and tools that our past has made 
possible for us. We don't reject anything and everything, but our con-
crete past that conditions, positions, and limits us in a specific way. 
We do not have an absolute, abstract, disconnected perspective to crit-
icize from . We are the outcome of our specific past. All we can do is 
to continue to criticize our best values. We can do that by using our 
past, our traditions, to undermine ourselves and to work toward the 
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sort of community that will facilitate and reinforce this process. I think 
that Marx can at least begin to help us think about such matters . 
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